

and Japan, but Mahan's lectures and magazine articles on current strategic problems also won an ever-widening audience in the United States that included such individuals as Theodore Roosevelt.

Mahan argued that the United States needed a strong navy to compete for the world's trade. He claimed that there was no instance of a great commercial power retaining its leadership without a large navy. He also criticized the traditional U.S. strategy of single-ship commerce raiding (*guerre de course*) because it could not win control of the seas. He argued for a seagoing fleet, an overbearing force that could beat down an enemy's battle line. Its strength had to be in battleships operating in squadrons. Mahan believed in the concentration of forces, urging that the fleet be kept in one ocean only. He also called for U.S. naval bases in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. Mahan had his shortcomings: he overlooked new technology, such as the torpedo and the submarine, and he was not concerned about speed in battleships.

Mahan was president of the Naval War College twice (1886–1889 and 1889–1893). He commanded the cruiser *Chicago*, flagship of the European Station (1893–1896), and was publically feted in Europe and recognized with honorary degrees from Oxford University and Cambridge University. An important apostle of the new navalism, he retired from the navy in 1896 to devote himself full-time to writing.

Mahan was called back to active duty with the navy in an advisory role during the 1898 Spanish–Cuban–American War. He was a delegate to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and was promoted to rear admiral on the retired list in 1906. He wrote a dozen books on naval

warfare and more than 50 articles in leading journals, and he was elected president of the American Historical Association in 1902. Mahan died in Washington, DC.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Roosevelt, Theodore; Spanish–Cuban–American War; U.S. Navy in the Caribbean

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MANIFEST DESTINY

Manifest destiny emerged as an ideology in the 1840s that the United States was destined to expand across the North American continent. Rather than a specific policy, manifest destiny was a belief in the superiority of the so-called Anglo-Saxon race and that westward expansion was divinely inspired, wise, and inevitable. This expansion would bring civilization and economic development to areas that previously had lain outside of areas of U.S. influence. Manifest destiny



John L. O'Sullivan, cofounder and editor of the United States Magazine and Democratic Review from 1837 to 1846, is said to have coined the term "Manifest Destiny," the so-called divine right of the United States to expand to the Pacific. (Harper's Weekly, 1874)

helped justify several U.S. military interventions in Latin America.

Journalist John L. O'Sullivan coined the term "manifest destiny" in 1845 to urge the annexation of Texas, California, Oregon, and other western territories. From his perspective, "providence" gave the United States a mission to spread democracy, which pointed to the partly religious origins of the ideology. The territorial expansion would occur as much through military force as through positive moral influences as immigrants colonized new areas. The roots of manifest destiny, however, can be traced back to the settlement of the North American British colonies in the 1600s, and particularly Puritan notions of creating a virtuous community and better society in the so-called New World. Proponents commonly pointed to the alleged inherent virtue of U.S. institutions and people,

and a divinely ordained mission to spread democratic institutions with a goal of re-making the rest of the world in the image of the United States. Manifest destiny, in other words, was an outgrowth of a larger U.S. exceptionalism.

Thomas Jefferson's 1803 Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the size of the United States, launched a period of territorial expansion of the United States. Until the onset of the Civil War in 1860, the United States expanded from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, "from sea to shining sea," and in the process largely established the borders of the contiguous United States. Manifest destiny can be interpreted as a corollary of James Monroe's 1823 Monroe Doctrine that sought to halt European colonization of the Americas. Advocates believed that expansion was necessary to forestall a reassertion of a European presence on the continent. Subsequently, Democrats came to embrace the concept of manifest destiny to support the expansionist plans of the James K. Polk administration.

Manifest destiny also placed significant pressure on Native Americans, implicitly leading to the occupation of their lands. This led to policies of Indian removal that moved natives to reservations to make way for an expanding white presence. Some advocates expected Indigenous peoples to disappear in the face of an advancing U.S. frontier.

Opponents criticized proponents of manifest destiny for citing "divine providence" as a justification for actions motivated by chauvinism and economic self-interest. Territorial expansion also meant an extension of slavery, which led critics to question whether manifest destiny in reality extended and opened up new areas to freedom. Others opposed manifest destiny because it would mean

incorporating what the dominant white population saw as less desirable peoples into the United States. These racist attitudes pointed to an inherent contradiction in manifest destiny: while nonwhites were seen as a lesser “race” and thus undesirable for incorporation into the United States, manifest destiny was also supposed to represent a civilizing mission that could improve such peoples’ lives. Racism was used both to promote and oppose manifest destiny. Nevertheless, this dissent helped slow and eventually stall U.S. expansion.

Texas

In 1836, U.S. immigrants to the Mexican state of Texas declared independence from its mother country. From a Mexican perspective, where historically most of the country’s mineral wealth and agricultural resources were concentrated further south, Texas was an undesirable backwater. Few Mexicans had voluntarily settled in the region. As a result, Texas was largely unpeopled in the 1820s when settlers began to pour in from the United States. At first settlers came in as part of a land-grant program, but even after Mexico suspended that program in 1830 Anglo-Americans continued to enter Texas illegally. Most settlers came from southern states and brought along African slavery as well as their protestant religion and English language. Mexico abolished slavery in 1829, but found that it could not enforce the new policy in Texas. The new immigrants also resisted assimilating into the Catholic religion, Spanish language, and Mexican culture and legal traditions.

England and France pressured Mexico to accept the idea of an independent Texas as a buffer against further U.S. expansion.

The incorporation of Texas into the United States was controversial because it would join as a slave state, thereby dividing the Democratic Party and shifting balances of power in the country. Polk interpreted his 1844 election to the presidency of the United States as a mandate for expansion and proceeded to annex Texas.

Mexican–American War

The annexation of Mexico led to the outbreak of the Mexican–American War in 1846. Although historically Texas had only extended to the Nueces River, Polk claimed territory to the Rio Grande (known as the Rio Bravo in Mexico). On May 11, 1846, Polk sent a message to congress announcing war with Mexico. He declared that Mexico had crossed the border, invaded the United States, and shed U.S. blood on U.S. soil. In the first time that a president had informed the U.S. Congress of a war before it was declared, Polk stated “war exists, and notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself.”

The subsequent conflict was a patently aggressive and unprovoked war of territorial expansion. Polk assumed openly expansionistic and nonconciliatory policies toward Mexico. Some proponents of the All Mexico Movement advocated expanding U.S. domination from the arctic to the tropics, often with the goal of reimplementing slavery throughout Mexico and Central America. Others, inhibited by racist sentiments, resisted the idea of extending U.S. citizenship to “colored” and “mixed” races. As a result, these people only wanted to take the sparsely populated northern regions of New Mexico and California.

The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe–Hidalgo that ended the war established the

international border as running from the mouth of the Rio Grande on the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. The 1853 Gadsden Purchase transferred from Mexico to the United States a narrow wedge of land from El Paso to the Colorado River that was more favorable to a transportation route, to incorporate some lands at a lower altitude. As a result of the war, Mexico lost about half of its territory to the United States. Neither Spain nor Mexico had explored or settled much of these huge swaths of territory. Nevertheless, the loss led to a crisis of Mexican political leadership and the rise of liberal reformers.

California

In the 1820s, the United States attempted to purchase California, but Mexico rejected the overture. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 led to a population boom. In only four years (1848–1852), the region's population zoomed from 15,000 to 250,000. Almost all of the population growth was located in northern California, and nearly all of it was due to immigrants from the United States. At the time, only 5,000 Mexicans resided in California. California was part of the land Mexico ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe–Hidalgo, and it became a state in 1850.

Filibusters

In the first half of the 19th century, several military filibusterers operated in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Although illegal, wealthy financiers supported their expeditions and the U.S. press romanticized their efforts. Often seen as adventurers or pirates, filibusterers were in reality more

than criminal bandits. They had ideologies and ideals that commonly included taking over a country and annexing it to United States.

During the 1840s and 1850s, several filibusterers from the United States attempted to free Cuba from Spanish colonial control. Rather than seeking to make Cuba an independent country, their interest was to make it a slave state of the United States. Financiers had an overt interest in preventing the island from becoming a colony of the British Empire or any other European power.

William Walker is possibly the most famous filibusterer of the 19th century. In 1855, Nicaraguan liberals invited him into their country as an ally in a civil war against their perennial enemies the conservatives. After Walker landed in Nicaragua, in 1856 he took over as president, reestablished slavery, made English the official language, and implemented a vagrancy law that forced peasants to work or face imprisonment. Walker's opponents eventually ran him out of the country, but he tried to come back three different times. Finally, in 1860 a Honduran firing squad executed the filibusterer. Nicaraguan historiography records Walker's initiative as the first U.S. effort to dominate their country.

With the death of Walker and the start of the Civil War in the United States, the golden age of the filibusterers as well as manifest destiny largely came to an end. Underlying imperialistic sentiments that fueled manifest destiny, however, persisted and continued to inform U.S. policy objectives.

Marc Becker

See also: Mexican War (1846–1848); Mexico; Race; Walker, William

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MANN, THOMAS (1912–1999)

Mann was a U.S. State Department official, presidential advisor, and one of the U.S. government's most important post-World War II Latin American policymak-

ers. His ideas placed anticommunism and U.S. investment in the middle of Latin American policy and facilitated the renewal of U.S. military intervention and tolerance for pro-U.S. military regimes.

Born in Laredo, Texas, Thomas C. Mann graduated from Baylor University in 1934 with BA and LLB degrees and then practiced law. He began working for the Department of State in 1942 as a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to Uruguay. He quickly made a reputation for himself as one of the U.S. government's more perceptive Latin American policymakers. As such, he began to assume important department positions making U.S. policy for the region.

In 1952, as deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Mann argued, in an important analysis of U.S. Latin American policy, that the disparity of wealth between the United States and Latin America would spur anti-Americanism and economic nationalism and that communists would exploit these circumstances. Willing to cast aside the U.S. nonintervention pledge, he concluded that Washington must intervene in Latin America if communism threatened to gain a foothold there.

Although he had been one of the creators of the multilateral Inter-American Development Bank, in 1959 Mann articulated his fears that plans for a large U.S. aid program for Latin America would raise unreasonably high expectations that could not be met, resulting in disillusionment and increased anti-Americanism in the region. Indeed, his misgivings were largely borne out in the Alliance for Progress, launched by President John F. Kennedy in 1961. Rhetorically, Kennedy called for reforms in the region to benefit the non-elite majority. Unfortunately, the