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Effects after the peace agreement with the Sandinistas
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 “Genuine autonomy must reflect the will and needs of those it serves, not simply be imposed form above” (Andrew Gray in Dennis 230).

Background

The agreement which included a cease-fire and autonomy plan was signed on February 2 1988, by Minister Tomas Borge and Brooklyn Rivera, a leader of Yatama (Organization of the Descendants of the Mother Land, a merger for the Indian resistance groups formerly known as Misura, Misurasata and Kisan).  The steps to this peace initiative started in 1984 when Rivera visited Nicaragua in October.In November, Rivera visited Honduras to unite all Miskitu Indians in exile but Honduran government would not deport them ("Misurasata/Sandanista" 59). In 1986, the Miskitu people were demanding that the Sandinista troops withdraw from the area.The Sandinista were afraid to do so because the Contras might move in.Furthermore, they were worried that the U.S. would continue their economic embargo.The Miskitu are stuck in the middle of a battle between the Contras and the Sandinistas.For example, the Contras attacked 15,000 Miskitus who returned to their homelands in Rio Coco and forced them back to Honduras.The Contras want to overthrow the government, while the Miskitu want their land rights and autonomy (Dibblin 19).

Even though the peace negations started, there were many concerns about the peace agreement.  The following comments are about the agreement.

Points of Resolved and Unresolved Issues

This agreement contained both resolved and unresolved issues.Points of agreement were: "Yatama was promised formal recognition as a community organization, something which has been denied its predecessor, Misurasata, since 1981. It also agreed to participation of the autonomous regional governments in development and use of mineral and ocean resources" (Wilde "Chance" 206).Unresolved issues included Yatama's desire to change in autonomy law to replace national military and police forces on the East coast with their own.  Thus, Fagot claims that the Sandinista government has been very untrustworthy and that the autonomy project only makes the central government control them more than give autonomy.He claims that true autonomy would allow them to control and only have the Costeños benefit from their natural resources (Dennis 221).

Indigenous concerns                                top

The coastal natives were skeptical but accepted the law that established two autonomous regions in 1987.Some insurgent leaders, however, did not return until September 1989 for the February 1990 elections.Over 40,000 coastal natives either were relocated or took refuge in Honduras and several thousand went to Costa Rica (Wilde "Recovering" 926).  These who emigrated apparently thought that their autonomy agreement or further relations with the Nicaragua state would not be helpful.

Even those who stayed on the coast have different ideas about the development of their autonomy law.The North, predominately Indian, wants expand the law whereas the South, Creoles wants to defend the benefits from the Plan. For example, the North has a regional Minister of Justice who wants to develop laws based on native customs and send any court cases involving western Nicaraguans to the Supreme Court in Managua.  They clearly are trying to divide themselves from the state.  Yet, the Creoles, who are predominately in the South Atlantic, wanted to still depend on the paternalistic government because the autonomy law had began to develop economic and administrative institutions in their area which allowed their economic base to grow.Yet, after the UNO created the Development of the Atlantic Region committee, the South worried that western Nicaraguans and foreign companies would come to their area and exploit fishing and timber resources (Wilde "Recovering" 926).This fear is significant since the central government has better technology to exploit these areas than the Creoles.

Political problems                                      top

In the 1990 elections, Yatama, the coastal native party, supported UNO coalition who was opposed to the Sandinista government.Yet, the UNO had not participated in the autonomy agreement and regional autonomy was questioned when UNO won the elections (Wilde "Recovering" 926).The new government created a cabinet-level Institute for the Development of the Atlantic Region, headed by former Miskitu insurgent leader Brooklyn Rivera.The creation of Institute for the Development of the Atlantic Region created the coastal natives to have doubt about their autonomy since Somoza and early Sandinista governments also created similar agencies to control the coast's activities (Wilde "Recovering" 926).

The UNO government also has different policies than the Sandinistas.This shift in focus intensifies the competition between the coastal government and the central government since the President Chamorro must ratify the coastal regional nominations for their departments.The president ratified regional departments for education, health and social services but has delayed those ratification for banking, fishing and natural resources which implies that the central government wants economic control over these areas (Wilde "Recovering" 927).

The only hope that the coastal natives can have is to trust that their leaders can fight for their desires of how affairs should be treated on the Atlantic Coast.

Not only are their conflicts between the regional and state government, but also intra-conflicts exist between the Yatama leaders, Brooklyn Rivera, Leonel Pantin, and Steadman Fagoth.  These men have tried to work together but their supporters between the North and South are divided.The North Atlantic Coast people do not entirely question Rivera's loyalty whereas the South people do not want ethnic and political cooperation that the new elected governor, Leonel Pantin, wants.Still other coastal citizens do not like UNO economic control or the Sandinistas because they had stripped their regional government of vehicles, maintenance and office equipment which makes communication with the central government impossible (Wilde "Recovering" 927).

Two organizations have mediated these tensions. They are the Moravian Church who is the predominant religious organization and the CEPAD (the ecumenical relief and development organization).The church has helped the peace process by mediating between the central government, communities, the insurgencies and refugees (Wilde "Chance" 207).Central government officials have had some suspicions but mainly the church is receiving opposition from the contras and U.S. contacts who have threatened Moravian leader's lives.

Economic problems                                  top

Autonomy is hard to grant when living conditions are poor.After the war, the central government needed the coastal resources to help their poor economy because the coast has lots of fishing, timber and mining.Furthermore, the regional coastal government depended on the central government for financing (Wilde "Recovering" 927).Therefore, the coastal region and the central government have an inter-dependent relationship.The dependency is heightened amongst the coastal people who have suffered from a natural disaster and need food.Some citizens claim that the Somoza paternalistic government was better than this autonomy since they have no food now (Wilde "Recovering" 927).

Effects of the war also make autonomy not be successful at times.Crime and international drug trading have escalated after the war.Citizens on the coast have less military and police presence, which allows crime to increase.Because of all the negative aspects, 1,200 refugees still remain in Honduras and those who are in the coast have no real unity (Wilde "Recovering" 927).

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