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Miskitu-Sandinista Conflict |
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Page Created by Adam
Aderton.
December 4, 2000 |
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Understanding the conflict between the Sandinista
Government (FSLN) of Nicaragua and the Miskitu
Indians of that nation’s Atlantic Coast is an extremely complex proposition
because the groups in conflict in this region were constantly shifting
alliances and changing goals.Before
the Miskitu-Sandinista conflict can be examined, the array of forces at
work in Nicaragua at the time of the 1979 revolution must be established.
In
July 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), popularly known
as the Sandinistas, overthrew long-time dictator Anastasio
Somoza.Unfortunately, the Sandinistas
had difficulty consolidating their power because of an upsurge in opposition
groups.Many of these diverse groups
were lumped together beneath the umbrella term contras.These
groups included the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) and the Democratic
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE).These
two groups would splinter, unite and recombine in a variety of permutations
and coalitions as the disloyal opposition until the overthrow of the Sandinista
government in the 1990 elections.These
contra
groups were heavily influenced by the United States Central Intelligence
Agency, particularly in the form of financial and military aid.
The Miskitu peoples added another element to this emerging Civil War in
Nicaragua.They, like the contras,
opposed the Sandinista government, but for different reasons.Unlike
the contras, who desired to overthrow the Sandinistas, the Miskitu
simply desired to be left alone.Under
the Somoza regime, and indeed, under most prior Nicaraguan governments
they had largely been allowed to pursue their own cultural ideals, if not
their own economic goals.This degree
of cultural autonomy was a function of both the rugged geography of the
Atlantic Coast region the peoples inhabited and of their relative isolation
from the mestizo society on the Pacific Coast.It
was only in the 1960s and 1970s that Miskitus began to organize to resist
Managua’s encroachment.In 1974,
the Miskitu, with the assistance of the Moravian Church, formed ALPROMISU,
a group working for the advancement and concerns of the Miskitu peoples
(Hale, 127).This
was the first umbrella resistance organization for the Miskitu, but following
the revolution it was co-opted by newcomers and the Sandinista government
in the formation of MISURASATA.This
new organization strived to work with the Sandinistas to find an appropriate
plan for transformation or continuation of the Miskitu way of life.At
first this new organization entered into a uneasy alliance with the government
in Managua, though each eyed the other rather suspiciously (Hale, 134).The
government and MISURASATA felt out one another’s positions on issues such
as land reform and literacy programs in these early months after the revolution.However,
when Miskitu demands became more than those which the government was willing
to tolerate, the leaders of MISURASATA were summarily arrested, igniting
a storm of protest against the central government among the Miskitu (Hale,
137).On 19 February 1981, Sandinista
officials attempted to arrest a Moravian minister connected with Misurasata.Shots
were fired.Four armed Sandinista
soldiers were killed as well as four unarmed Miskitu youths (Nietschmann,
33).This was the spark that ignited
the powder keg of indigenous Sandinista relations.From
this point, gradual further inroads by the Sandinistas into Miskitu autonomy,
charismatic MISURASATA leadership and grass roots Miskitu resentment caused
the region to erupt in open warfare (Hale, 169).
The national military situation must be recalled to create a context for
the Miskitu revolt.The Sandinistas
were fighting the FDN in the north, ARDE in the southwest and the Miskitu
in the east.This three front war
was impossible for the Sandinistas to win.What
complicated the conflict even more were the shifting alliances between
the Miskitu and the contra groups.In
1983, Steadman Fagoth and his faction broke with MISURASATA to form MISURA,
an even more militant wing of the Miskitu resistance (Nicaraguan
Biographies, 94).This group
allied with the FDN.MISURASATA,
now depleted in numbers joined an alliance with the ARDE. To combat
these new alliances, the Sandinistas entered into a pattern of negotiation
and military attack in dealing with the Miskitu in an effort to remove
them from the larger contra war.
The dual weights of international pressure coupled with the logistical
difficulties of fighting guerrilla wars on several fronts forced the Sandinistas
to negotiate with the Miskitu.These
negotiations were often initiated with optimism running high, but rarely
did they do anything but cease-fire until international pressure had subsided
or the Sandinistas had regrouped.Further,
these negotiating sessions were often held near the times that the US Congress
was voting whether to continue financial support for the contras.By
negotiating, the Sandinistas made may have made it appear to the US that
no more appropriations were needed since the conflict had ended.This
strategic move would have eliminated the contras base of financial
support and effectively ended the guerrilla wars (Nietchmann, 68-87).However,
when this international pressure was lifted, the Sandinistas frequently
resumed their attacks on the Miskitu and on the contras. Though
these same types of negotiations did eventually lead to the autonomy accord,
this document has not effectively safeguarded the culture and economic
viability of the Miskitu culture due to a lack of enforcement.Thus,
these negotiations must be seen as bearing few lasting fruits.
Just as the Sandinistas were using the Miskitu as pawns in their war with
the
contras
and their negotiations with international actors, so,
too, were the
contras themselves abusing the Miskitu.Though
the contras likely had the necessary supplies, they only allowed
enough aid to reach the Miskitu for these indigenous peoples to maintain
a front in opposition to the Sandinistas.They
did not allow them enough materiel to actually achieve a victory (Nietschmann,
37).Indecisiveness on the Eastern
front would give the contras more leverage in their negotiations
for money and materiel from the United States and other international actors.Further,
should the contras ever reverse the revolution, the Miskitu’s failure
in their war with the Sandinistas would make them much easier to control.
This stalemate of shifting alliances, negotiations and political splintering
persisted until the formation of the groups Army
of the Nicaraguan Resistance (ERN) and YATAMA,
which is particularly significant as a group representing the consolidation
of the Miskitu resistance.This organization
allied itself with the newly-formed ERN in 1987.The
situation for the insurgents in Nicaragua was improving until Hurricane
Joan crashed into Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast in October 1988.This
disaster brought relief from Cuba in the form of troops who helped to consolidate
the Sandinista government’s hold on the region.Over
the next two years, the varied resistance movements in Nicaragua consolidated
even further, culminating in the formation Nicaraguan
Resistance (RN) in 1987 (Nicaraguan Biographies, 95).This
new group included the peoples of the Atlantic Coast, exiled leaders from
the reign of Somoza, conservatives, labor interests and others.It
was this new coalition that eventually removed the Sandinistas from power
through peaceful elections in 1990.Unfortunately,
the Miskitu people, though ostensibly protected, continued to be exploited
by the business and agricultural interests of this new government.Their
search for economic and cultural autonomy goes on.
As our class discussion demonstrated, what makes the conflict between the
Miskitu and the Sandinista government so difficult to sort out is the shifting
alliances goals and motives of the leaders of the Miskitu, the contras
and the Sandinistas.Throughout the
conflict, the Miskitu faced significant limitations in materiel in comparison
to the Sandinistas.Coping with these
discrepancies may have contributed to the splintered nature of the Miskitu
resistance.Nonetheless, it was in
large part this political splintering that contributed to the failure of
the Miskitu to achieve military victory.
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